Karl Popper – The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945)

Kai Froeb2026

This text is a preview of History of the Reception of Hegel, volume II, to be published in 2026 by Reflexivity Press.

The Epistemological Critique of Totalitarianism

While Hayek argues economically, Karl Popper develops at the same time – independently, but with remarkable convergence – an epistemological critique of totalitarianism. His book The Open Society and Its Enemies appears in 1945, in two volumes. Volume 1 deals with Plato, Volume 2 with “Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath.”

Popper’s starting point is not economics but philosophy of science. His question: what distinguishes science from pseudoscience? His answer: falsifiability. A theory is scientific if it can in principle be refuted – if it makes risky predictions that can fail.[1]

Popper transfers this epistemological insight to politics: what distinguishes open from closed societies? Open societies are capable of criticism – they can correct errors, reform themselves, learn. Closed societies are dogmatic – they immunize themselves against criticism, hold their truth to be absolute, persecute dissidents.

And Hegel, according to Popper, is the archetype of the closed society. His philosophy of history is historicism – the belief that history follows recognizable laws, that the future is predictable, that the philosopher (or leader) can perceive the direction of history. This is the seed of totalitarianism.

Who Was Popper? Émigré and Critic

Karl Raimund Popper (1902-1994) was, like Hayek, a Viennese. Born into an assimilated Jewish family (his father had converted to Protestantism), he grew up in the intellectual milieu of Red Vienna. He studied mathematics, physics, psychology, and philosophy, earning his doctorate in 1928 on the psychology of thought.

His formative experience: the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy, the turmoil of the First Republic (1918-1938), the rise of fascism. In 1919, at seventeen, Popper briefly sympathized with the Communists – and left them after a traumatic experience: during a demonstration, a worker was shot dead by police. Popper realized: the Party had deliberately put the workers in danger in order “to sharpen the class struggle.” From that point on: an abhorrence of any ideology that sacrifices people for abstract ends.

In 1937 Popper emigrated to New Zealand – just in time. In 1938 came the annexation of Austria; many of his relatives were later murdered. In New Zealand, at Canterbury University College in Christchurch, he wrote The Open Society during the war – “my war effort,” as he later called it.[2]

His main opponents: Plato (Volume 1), Hegel and Marx (Volume 2). But also: the Viennese intellectuals who gave philosophical legitimacy to fascism and communism. And the British Hegelians (F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet), whose philosophy of the state struck him as totalitarian.

His sources: Popper did not read Hegel systematically in the original but chiefly through secondary sources – especially William Wallace (a British Hegelian), Arthur Schopenhauer (a radical critic of Hegel), and popular accounts. This will matter.

The Three Main Charges: Holism, Essentialism, Historicism

Popper’s critique of Hegel has three thrusts:

First charge: holism “The whole is more than the sum of its parts” – that sounds harmless. But for Popper it is the core of totalitarianism.

Hegel’s statement from the Philosophy of Right (§258):

“The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea – the ethical spirit as substantial will, manifest and clear to itself, which thinks and knows itself and carries out what it knows […].”

Popper’s interpretation: the state stands above the individual. The “whole” (state, nation, people) is “more real” than the parts (individuals). The individual has value only insofar as it serves the whole.

This is collectivism – and collectivism leads to totalitarianism. For if the whole is more important than the parts, individuals can be sacrificed for the whole. “The welfare of the people” legitimizes the destruction of “pests of the people.”

Popper writes:

“Hegel’s holistic collectivism […] leads straight to totalitarianism.”[3]

Second charge: essentialism Hegel works with “concepts of essence” – the state is the actuality of the ethical Idea, the family is immediate ethical life, civil society is the system of needs. This sounds like Platonism: there are “essences” lying behind appearances that the philosopher can know.

Popper’s counter-position: nominalism. Concepts are conventions, not essences. “The state” is not an entity that exists independently of individuals – “state” is a name for certain institutions, practices, relations among individuals. If we forget this, we hypostatize abstractions (turn concepts into things) – and end up with: “the state wills,” “the nation demands,” “history determines.”

This is dangerous because it obscures responsibility. It is not “the state” that oppresses – concrete people oppress, legitimized by the fiction that they are “serving the state.” It is not “history” that demands sacrifices – concrete ideologues demand sacrifices, legitimized by the claim that they are executing “historical necessity.”

Third charge: historicism (the most important one!)

Historicism is, for Popper, the core of Hegel’s danger. He defines it:

“I mean by ‘historicism’ an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the ‘rhythms’ or the ‘patterns’, the ‘laws’ or the ‘trends’ that underlie the evolution of history.”[4]

The logic:

  1. Laws of history: history follows laws (like nature). In Hegel: dialectic (thesis-antithesis-synthesis). In Marx: the relations of production determine the superstructure, class struggle drives history forward.

  2. Knowability: these laws are knowable – the philosopher (Hegel) or the revolutionary (Marx) sees through them.

  3. Predictability: whoever knows the laws can predict the future. Hegel: the “sublation” of alienation in the absolute state. Marx: communism as the “end of prehistory.”

  4. Legitimation: whoever stands on the right side of history (the “progressive class,” the “world-historical people”) acts rightfully. Resistance is “reactionary” – it stands against historical necessity.

  5. Elimination: whoever stands on the wrong side of history must be eliminated. Stalin: “the kulaks are a class condemned to perish.” Nazism: “the Jews stand against the progress of humanity.”

This is the totalitarian logic: historical necessity legitimizes mass murder.

Popper cites Hegel’s sentence:

“World history is the world’s court of judgment [Weltgericht].” (Philosophy of Right §340)

His interpretation: whoever wins historically is right. Might makes right. Success legitimizes violence.

Kaufmann’s Counter-Critique: “The Hegel Myth”

But does Popper’s critique actually hit Hegel? In 1951, six years after Popper’s book, Walter Kaufmann published a devastating essay: “The Hegel Myth and Its Method.”[5]

Kaufmann’s central thesis: Popper does not read Hegel in the original but through three distorting filters:

First: he cites mainly William Wallace (1844-1897), a British Hegelian whose interpretation is very free.

Second: he uncritically adopts Arthur Schopenhauer’s polemical critique of Hegel. Schopenhauer hated Hegel for personal reasons (he lost to him in the competition for the Berlin professorship) and wrote of “Hegel, a flat-headed, insipid, nauseating, illiterate charlatan.”[6]

Third: Popper systematically confuses Hegel with the British Hegelians (Bradley, Bosanquet), whose philosophy of the state is indeed problematic – but does not represent Hegel’s own position.

Kaufmann demonstrates three concrete misunderstandings:

Misunderstanding 1: “The actual is rational” Popper reads Hegel’s statement “What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational” (Philosophy of Right, Preface) as: whatever exists is good. Critique is pointless; what exists is legitimated.

But Hegel distinguishes actuality (Wirklichkeit) from mere existence (Dasein). Not everything that exists is actual! Only what corresponds to its concept is “actual” – what has realized its inner necessity. Much exists without being actual – it is contingent, external, accidental.

Example: a corrupt state exists but is not actual (in the Hegelian sense), because it contradicts its concept (the state as the realization of freedom). Hegel does not legitimize it – on the contrary, the analysis shows: it will fail, because it is internally contradictory.

Misunderstanding 2: “World history is the world’s court of judgment”

Popper reads this as: whoever wins is right. Might makes right.

But Hegel means: history shows which principles prove themselves durable over the long run, which fail. Not every victor is legitimated – many conquerors failed (Napoleon!). History is not the right of the stronger, but a process in which rational orders prevail because they are more stable, more capable of being recognized.

Example: the Roman Empire conquered the world by force – but failed in the long run, because it was only external domination, no mutual recognition. Christianity “won” without armies, because it contained a principle (the recognition of all as equal before God) that proved more sustainable.

Misunderstanding 3: Hegel as a Prussian state philosopher

Popper assumes: Hegel uncritically legitimized the Prussian state of his time. The Philosophy of Right is an apology for the Prussian monarchy.

But Hegel’s Philosophy of Right criticizes the Prussian state repeatedly:

  • §§243-245: criticism of “civil society,” which fails to prevent poverty (against laissez-faire)
  • §308: the constitution of estates should grow “organically” out of society (against the Prussian system imposed from above)
  • §316: a demand for publicity in legislation (against Prussian secret politics)

Prussia censored the Philosophy of Right! The Preface (“What is rational…”) was felt to be subversive – it implies: much of what exists is not rational.

Kaufmann sums up:

“Popper’s Hegel is a myth. It is not based on a careful reading of Hegel’s texts, but on hostile secondary sources, polemical caricatures, and systematic misunderstandings.”[7]

What Is True in This? (Sublation I)

Despite the misunderstandings, Popper captures something important:

A legitimate concern: openness is under threat Popper’s central concern is: the capacity for criticism is the hallmark of free societies. “Falsifiability” in science, “critical rationalism” in politics, the “open society” as an ideal – all of these are variants of the same principle: systems must be able to correct themselves.

This is a genuine insight. Systems that immunize themselves against criticism accumulate errors. Scientific theories that interpret away every refutation (psychoanalysis: “resistance proves the theory is right!”) are pseudoscience. Political systems that declare every critic a “pest of the people” become rigid, cannot learn, and eventually fail.

Hegel’s dialectic is, after all, precisely a logic of self-correction: every stage shows its limit, is overcome. This is Popperian falsification avant la lettre! But: Hegel did not consistently carry this over into politics. His Philosophy of Right shows few institutions for permanent self-criticism (opposition, a free press, a critical public are only weakly developed there).

A legitimate criticism: the philosophy of history can become dogmatic

Hegel’s philosophy of history sometimes suggests: history has a direction that is knowable. The philosopher can recognize, after the fact, the “necessity” of the development. This can (not must) lead to dogmatism: “I know the direction of history, so I may crush resistance.”

Stalin invoked “historical necessity.” Mao justified the Great Leap Forward as “a law of history.” These were abuses – but they were possible because philosophy of history is susceptible to abuse.

The elephant principle: Popper captures one aspect: openness (self-criticism) is fundamental. Systems without openness fail.

Internal Contradictions (Sublation II)

But Popper’s position has contradictions of its own:

First contradiction: performative self-contradiction

Popper demands: permanent openness to criticism, no dogmatic claims to truth, “critical rationalism” instead of “uncritical rationalism.”

But his own critique of Hegel is itself uncritical: he reads Hegel through secondary sources (Wallace, Schopenhauer), largely ignores Kaufmann’s counter-critique, and immunizes his own interpretation against refutation (“all defenders of Hegel are totalitarians in waiting”).

This shows: openness cannot merely be proclaimed as a principle – it must be practiced. Whoever demands it only of others while judging dogmatically himself violates, performatively, what he theoretically advocates.

A genuine “critical rationalist” would have to say: “My interpretation of Hegel could be wrong. Let us read the texts together.” Popper instead says: “Hegel is totalitarian, period.”

Second contradiction: the paradox of tolerance Popper formulates a famous paradox:

“Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. […] We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant.”[8]

This is correct, but it shows: even the “open society” must set limits. It must be “closed” against the enemies of openness. But who decides who counts as an “enemy of openness”? Popper has no clear answer – and this is precisely the problem Hegel saw: mediation is necessary. Pure openness (anyone may say anything) is self-destructive. But who mediates?

Hegel’s answer: institutions (law, ethical life, the state). Popper’s answer: “critical discussion.” But what if the discussion fails? If “enemies of openness” undermine the discussion (disinformation, violence, intimidation)? Then one needs: institutions that protect discussion – exactly what Hegel developed.

Third contradiction: negative utopia instead of positive vision

Popper defines the “open society” negatively: by what it is not (totalitarian, dogmatic, closed). But what is it positively? What does a good society look like?

Popper rejects “utopia” – any vision of “the good life” leads, he thinks, to totalitarianism (“whoever tries to create heaven on earth creates hell”). His alternative: “piecemeal social engineering” – gradual reforms, error correction, no grand designs.

But this is too thin. Human beings need positive goals, not only error avoidance. “We do not know what is good, but we avoid what is bad” – that does not motivate. And: without some conception of the good, how does one recognize what is bad?

Hegel’s insight, which Popper overlooks: freedom needs institutional form. It is not enough to say, “everyone should do what he wants, so long as he does not disturb others” (the negative concept of freedom). For then everyone is atomized, without relation, unfree (because dependent on chance). Concrete freedom arises in institutions – family, civil society, state – that structure mutual recognition.

Fourth contradiction: faith in science Popper trusts that “critical discussion” produces truth. If all theories are falsifiable, if all hypotheses are tested, if the best theory survives – then we approach truth.

But this presupposes:

  • symmetrical power relations (everyone can discuss on equal terms)
  • rational actors (everyone follows arguments, not ideology or profit)
  • shared standards (what counts as a “refutation”?)

In science this may (partially) work – through peer review, replication, institutionalized criticism. But in politics? There one finds propaganda, disinformation, economic interests, asymmetries of power, affects.

Popper overestimates the force of argument and underestimates the power of power. Habermas will later take this up: what is needed is a discourse free of domination – but such conditions must first be created.

Systematic Placement (Sublation III)

Popper captures one aspect: openness, capacity for criticism, error correction are fundamental. Systems lacking these fail in the long run – because they cannot learn, and dysfunctions accumulate.

But he overlooks:

  1. Openness needs mediation: pure openness (“anyone may say anything”) destroys itself (the paradox of tolerance). Institutions are needed that enable and protect discourse – exactly what Hegel developed.

  2. Criticism needs standards: without shared criteria (what counts as a good argument?), criticism is arbitrary. These standards are not “natural” but must be developed – this is Bildung (Hegel’s concept), not merely “critical discussion.”

  3. Negative freedom is not enough: “freedom from coercion” (Popper’s ideal) is too thin. Human beings also need “freedom to” – positive goals, institutional enablement, social recognition.

  4. Hegel is no dogmatist: Hegel’s dialectic is itself a form of criticism – radical self-criticism, even. Every stage reveals its own limit. This is closer to Popper than Popper admits.

Later thinkers synthesize Popper and Hegel:

Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action, 1981): critical discourse (Popper) PLUS institutional mediation (Hegel) = communicative rationality.

Charles Taylor (Hegel, 1975): Popper’s critique does not hit Hegel, but a caricature. Hegel’s theory of freedom is compatible with liberal values.

Karl-Otto Apel (transcendental pragmatics): criticism presupposes performative conditions (recognizing the other as an interlocutor) – this is Hegelian.

The synthesis: openness (Popper) + mediation (Hegel) = reflexive institutions that enable AND protect self-criticism.

Transition to 2.3

Hayek argued economically: central planning destroys knowledge. Popper argued epistemologically: philosophy of history destroys criticism. Both capture aspects – but both miss Hegel.

Hannah Arendt develops a third, political critique of totalitarianism. And her relationship to Hegel is more nuanced: first she criticizes him (Origins of Totalitarianism, 1951), later she uses him (The Human Condition, 1958). This shows: one can learn from the critique of totalitarianism without discarding Hegel.

Her question: what is new about totalitarianism? Not merely dictatorship, tyranny, oppression – these have always existed. Rather: total domination – a system that does not merely enforce obedience but seeks to reshape the subjects themselves. This is radical. And: what are its origins? Her answer: antisemitism, imperialism, mass movement. Hegel plays an ambivalent role…

  1. Karl Popper: The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934). Popper’s falsification criterion: scientific theories must state the conditions under which they would be false. Theories that are immunized against any refutation (psychoanalysis, Marxism) are not scientific. ↩︎

  2. Karl Popper: Unended Quest (autobiography, 1976), Chapter 21: “I saw the book as my war effort.” Popper wanted to fight intellectually against totalitarianism while others fought physically. ↩︎

  3. Karl Popper: The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2 (1945), Chapter 12, p. 31. ↩︎

  4. Karl Popper: The Poverty of Historicism (1957, but already published as essays in 1944), Preface. ↩︎

  5. Walter Kaufmann: “The Hegel Myth and Its Method,” Philosophical Review 60:4 (1951), pp. 459–486. Kaufmann, a German-Jewish émigré and Princeton professor, shows systematically that Popper misunderstood Hegel. ↩︎

  6. Arthur Schopenhauer: quoted in Kaufmann (1951), p. 462. Schopenhauer’s critique of Hegel is pure polemic, not philosophy. ↩︎

  7. Kaufmann (1951), p. 486. ↩︎

  8. Popper: Open Society, Vol. 1, Chapter 7, Note 4. ↩︎