Cunning of Reason
Hegel (Logic of the Concept, Teleology)
The cunning of reason is the strategy by which purposes realize themselves without the agent expending itself. The purpose uses the means: it lets objects act according to their own laws (mechanics, chemism) and thereby achieves its purpose. Example: the human being uses the hammer (means) according to its mechanical laws, instead of striking with the bare hand. Reason is "cunning" because it does not fight directly, but *uses* the inherent logic of objects. This is not a theodicy, but a *structural description*: the good craftsman gets to know his material. The *philosophy-of-history* transfer (Napoleon unintentionally realizes the principles of the revolution) is to be distinguished from this — it can become an apologetic figure if it suggests that reason cosmically asserts itself. We argue in Ch. 16.9 against the reading that makes the human being a "plaything."
Origin
Hegel invents this concept. "Cunning" (Greek *mÄ“tis*) was already present in Homer (Odysseus). Hegel: in teleology, reason is cunning — it works indirectly. Often applied to history (cunning of world-history), but stems from logic.
In Hegel
Enc. §209 (addition); SL Vol. 2, Teleology
Cross-references
End (Zweck) · Means · Teleology · Mechanism · Objectivity · Concept