Comments on making Hegel popular
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1.

Here are some answers to questions from other Hegelians raised by my article "Making Hegel popular". They concern:

2.

As for quoting Hegel, I don't mind you or anyone else Hegel, quite the contrary. However, the place of the quote as argument will depend on the type of discussion.

2a) In discussions of the type "did Hegel said this or that", "What did Hegel say on xyz" etc, this quoting is of course very important.

2b) But when we want to reconstruct Hegel's thinking/System, we would not end there. Instead, we will then have to look at the arguments, which Hegel presents in these quotes, themselves, and they will finally decide on the truth of these arguments, not whether Hegel uses them or not.

Also, who would stop us in rethinking these arguments, finding better ones or problem (no to say faults<g>) in them?

These two issues should not be mixed, and I think the type b) kind of questions deserve the main attention among Philosophers.

That Hegel says an argument, shows a preference etc, may give us a hint where to search (and I'm the first one to agree that Hegel is a far superior genius then I am, so that when Hegel says something it is a valuable hint, see also 8), but it should in a b) type discussion never be used as a substitution of an argument. And always when we hear Hegel saying something we have always to look at whether he is right, what are his arguments for this etc.

Even in a), a single quote might not be enough, similar as a single quote from the Bible might not be enough. Like with the Bible, questions arise like what is the relevance of that quote, what is it's context, what other/contrary etc. quotes are in the works etc.

So even when we quote a), we sooner or later come to a position b) were we rethink the arguments we quote in order to understand what is their relevance, their place in the system etc. So even there quoting alone will probably seldom do the job (alone).

When I draw above a parallel of quoting Hegel and quoting the bible, this is not meant to insult Hegel or those quoting Hegel, but to draw a parallel of the problems which arise from sticking to the "text" / "scripture". This applies to any text, but historically, the problem arose in any culture especially from understanding the "holy scriptures".

But applied to Hegel: when I see our Hegel texts in German, we often have several different editions, and it is possible to find often very different positions of Hegel in his life, which he even changes in Berlin (as you can for example see from the different lectures he had on the Philosophy of Religion).

Usually I would use the last version of Hegel's thought as the one that is relevant for me (so that's one reason why I stick to the Berlin Hegel as opposed to the Hegel of the Phenomenology (these positions differ in several places) or an earlier version). However, sometimes the earlier version seems to be better in some context (and also it is good to know the development of Hegel as well as the context of his time, for a better understanding of the later Hegel).

Also, I feel that the translation of Hegel into English add even much more difficulties to this. Even in case one would not consider any problems with quoting Hegel in German, you would always have to make sure that the translation you use is adequate to what Hegel says in German. As you will know, this is often not the case, or at least doubtful.

 

3.

>> And you wonder why there is so little cooperation among Philosophers, my dear Kai?<<

I was wondering about how to raise cooperation between Hegelians, not necessarily between all kind of philosophers (At least not in the first place). I'm sorry if my limited English did not made that idea too clear in the first place.

My idea was that we might see bigger advances in Hegel studies then we see today when Hegelians could agree on the essence of Hegelianism and a goal to archive, and the divide the task to be taken into small pieces which would be solved in cooperation.

May be it is already done like this, as an outsider I can't really judge. I see big advances in the last 20 years or so, but I think they could be much more, especially after we now have this solid ground (also don't know exactly how the situation in the English speaking world looks like, though).

4.

I wrote:

"For me, Hegel aims at higher scientific standards than those common today, not lesser."

And someone answered:

> But you think that for others this is not the case, Kai Froeb? 

I don't know. I really don't want to imply anything hidden by this, as I'm looking for a fruitful discussion I'm trying to keep things open. That I wrote "for me," in the above sentence is to allow others to share different views (and hopefully argue for them).

I am aware that at a later stage we want to argue for our positions, but at the given stage I mainly look for different positions in the discussion and hope for a vivid discussion.

Among other things, I'm teaching all sort of computer lessons since 1984, and my experience is that people tend to block themselves/resist from participating because of the fear being teared down. So I'm trying to provide a friendly atmosphere so that people feel invited to share their positions (I'm sorry that it didn't work for you).

5.

>> Do you not see, my dear Kai, that the objection to quoting Hegel is merely the fear of Hegel popularization itself?<<

No. I have to admit that I don't see any strong relations.

>> Professional academicians who fear Hegel popularization do not  deserve our support.<<

I'm not sure what you are exactly talking about.

In case you are talking about academic Hegelians, first I have to say that I feel very thankful for any academic work that is done on behalf of Hegel.

When I see the wonderful Hegel editions they provided and the wonderful commentaries on Hegel's work they produced, I feel overwhelmed by thankfulness.

Second, I think it is a Hegelian attitude to first look at/search for what is reasonable in a given position (see also 8). So before I don't see what is the reasonable statement behind "fearing popularization of Hegel" I would not comment.

I can see several good reasons for a fear of popularization of Hegel, most of them boil down to the fear of a a wrong/false version of Hegelianism to be spread.

And I think that this fear is reasonable, when you look at the various false interpretation of Hegel which are circulating even among other philosophers, between different wings of Hegel interpretation or among the common public (If I understand you right, this is also something you are aware of and what you feel sorry about).

And I also see that people who earn their money and/or even dedicate their live and their reputation to Hegel studies deserve our attention that we don't spoil their jobs and their image. If we can't even cooperate among ourselves, how can we lay down a foundation for an even broughter cooperation?

6.

As for which kind of Hegel one should use, personally I see clearly the Berlin Hegel, as this presents us the version of Hegel's system which he himself did find the most satisfying / perfect.

However, the very fact that Hegel himself did change his system his whole life and even changed parts in his Berlin teachings clearly shows that his teachings are not written in stone. I think one of the primary goals of Hegel studies is to reproduce the "mind of Hegel", and this will include the ability to change Hegel's teachings as he himself would also have done it. Even his most deserved scholars, btw, did not had any problems doing so, btw.

OTOH, some parts of Hegel's older thoughts might be better solutions to some of Hegel's problems, again see Hösle for some samples (all this is also a good extension to 2).

7.

As for how to judge "basic" changes in Hegel system, it may depend on what we see as basic.

Let's take for an easy example Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, as it is the subject of a parallel thread.

While I'm the first one (as you can see from the bibliographical notes I present in that other mail), who would argue for that Hegel indeed tried to sublate all fundamental of natural science of his time and that even today a lot of his PoN makes sense (beside showing a kind of parallel between Hegel and Einstein's Theory, Hösle mentions for example an other work, which tries to show the same with Quantum theory).

And Hösle also discusses that when Hegel does identify a part of his PoN with a false fact/theory of his time, that may not speak against Hegel's System as such, as this might very well be a "translation error" of Hegel (a better realization of his system can be found in a more modern concept or in a concept still to be discovered/come).

However, when I were to rewrite the PoN, I would probably rewrite it from scratch, in order to fit the concept of modern natural science best. But I would do it in a way to try that anything valuable in Hegel's (and may be others) PoN is preserved. And yes, I agree, that the more you know it, the more you find to preserve and vice versa.

Okay, but let's assume that in order to really sublate modern mathematic, quantum physics and gravitation theories, cellular biology, genetics and evolution theory etc., we make some changes of the system at this place.

This will immediately ask for changes in other places of the system:

E.g. we will have to look at the logic, and see if we can find new better categories or "Übergaenge", which will better reflect the changes in the PoN (in reality we will already take a close look at the Logic every time we feel like changing some parts of the PoN).

Then again, other parts of the system which are determined by that part of the logic also, may be looked at if they can profit from a rewrite.

8.

As for the way of the spirit since Hegel's death, I do see a lot of new topics came up in politics, arts, science, philosophy and others.

All this has to be addressed and understood.

You mainly seem to argue that a) the new topics aren't really new and (probably as a consequence of a)) that b) they are already handled by Hegel.

It is one-sided to see in the new things that what is common with older things, to be fair, one will also try to look for what is new in them (and vice versa). And even if you only see the old topics, the question remains why are they reappearing from their graves.

In any good ghost film/book you will learn that these ghost come back because there is something not settled yet. I presume the same when these "old" theories appear again, not only as a side track but as a main topic of the thinking of a time.

So one thing that I suspect is that even when they are older than Hegel and handled by him, that may be Hegel did not handle all consequences of their thought. May be there is something new to discover? Wonderful for the advance of knowledge/science.

b)

It is always easy to see/say that something is different from your opinion (Hegel) and from that to conclude that this other is to be condemned.

However, Hegel wrote <g>, the hard task is to find what is reasonable (and may be new/unknown/overlooked) in these other "opinions".

This is a very important point to me, as I see this as the main guarantee for that Hegelianism doesn't become dogmatic and static but instead is open for new insights, even basic ones.

Again, I see a parallel with believing systems, were the believer sees the whole rest of the world not in the procession of the truth and to be convinced (And probably is driven by bad forces in case they resist).

(Get me right, my argument is *not* that *you* have such a belief system, but that when we agree that such a behavior would not in our favor, we have to see to it/make sure, that we ourselves don't get in this direction).

Coming back to Hegel, I don't see that drawing a separation line: "here Hegelianism, there other stupid Non-Hegelians" adequate to Hegel's method. It would mean a simple negation of all Non/After Hegelian philosophies.

I OTOH, think it is hard to find *any* thought which doesn't contain some grain of truth. OTOH, I realize that modern philosophical systems usually have their problems were they can implicit be criticized. But the task would be to a) criticize them implicit, not just in comparing them with Hegel. That in the first place implies understanding them (and when you realize that most people misunderstand Hegel, how can you be sure that, when you only see stupidity and misunderstanding, that you understood this other philosophy?). And then in the end, to include the possible new ideas, facts, topics like bringing back as treasures <g>.

May be the difference is that you think that a philosopher after Hegel has to be superior to Hegel. I share your thought that the philosophers after Hegel are not superior to Hegel. But I don't share the idea that they have to be superior. Presenting new material in some way or the other will be enough.

There is a very good book of Vittorio Hoesle, "Wahrheit und Geschichte", which deals very much with this subject. I will go into greater details on this when I have more time.

And yes, I also think that before changing something in Hegel's system one needs to understand it. And I would even subscribe the idea that in any case of doubt to be in favour for Hegel (in the sense that it might be us, who did not understand him well enough).

And BTW, I write all this in favour of successfully sublating (which includes but is not limited to, see above, criticizing) the modern thoughts. Also in the sense that their modern supporters feel like that our critique is adequate (it is always easy to win battles in the round of friends who agree).

 

See also: our program

 


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